Chicken wire, AI and mobile phones on sticks: how the drone war in Ukraine is driving a fierce battle of innovation

Drones are the signature technology of the Ukraine war. A few miniature aircraft designs were used in the war’s early days, but an incredible array of drones have now evolved. There are different types, sizes and levels of sophistication. They are used for many roles including short- and long-range attack, reconnaissance, electronic disruption, communications relay and supply.

Many are repurposed consumer drones, such as the low-cost Chinese DJI designs sold in electronics stores. Such drones are modified as combat demands require and are being flown in their hundreds every day in Ukraine.

Before the war, military aircraft were very expensive and military forces could field very few. Drones have completely upended this situation, hugely increasing the numbers of air systems.

Ukraine is now making more than 3,000 first-person view (or FPV) drones each day (that is not a typo). These allow an operator to see from the drone’s camera in real time.

A new multinational drone coalition, of which Australia is part, plans to deliver one million of these. They can be assembled from commercially available digital electronics in small workshops and people’s homes.

Larger drones are made in purpose-built factories, but production rates remain stunning compared with modern military aircraft. The United States makes about 150 F-35 jet fighters a year. Russia’s new factory making Shahed 136 long-range attack drones will churn out 6,000 annually.

Drone defence

Wars involve actions and reactions, as each side struggles to gain advantage. The mass use of drones has inspired a rush to field a matching array of counter-drone systems.

Broadly speaking, these systems come in two kinds: those used for homeland defence and those protecting soldiers on the battlefield.

For homeland defence, the aim is to detect attacking drones, track them and try to destroy them when they come within range. The Russians often fire between 80 and 100 Shahed drones against Ukraine cities each night, usually in waves. These drones are noisy, low-flying and slow.

Ukraine has developed an ingenious system to detect the Shahed drones. Two engineers working in a garage created a sound-detecting system using consumer mobile phones stuck on poles that can hear drones passing by.

Data from a network of 9,500 phone-on-pole sensors is then relayed to a central command post, where it is fused together to give a complete picture of what is happening in the airspace across the whole of Ukraine. Gun or missile air defences are then activated and moved as necessary to fire at passing Shahed drones.

The Ukrainian air defences generally destroy about 80% of the attacking drones.

Drones on the battlefield

Battlefield drone defence is different. Here the drones are small and quiet, and crucially are not autonomous. Each drone needs to be flown by an operator who watches the video transmitted from the drone to find the enemy forces. The aim of counter-drone efforts is primarily to evade detection, and only try to destroy the drones if there is no alternative.

Most vehicles in the battlefield have sensors to detect a drone’s communication transmission links when they are nearby. Vehicles can then speed up to make it harder for the slow-moving drones to attack, or stop and hide under overhead cover, such as trees or building awnings.

Battlefield vehicles can also carry electronic systems able to jam the drone’s communications transmission links or the drone’s GPS satellite navigation system, thereby making the drones ineffective.

First-person view drones can also chase down and attack individual soldiers. Against these, soldiers stop moving, hide in trenches and try to blend in with the background.

The Ukrainians also use a vast array of decoy systems such as wooden tanks and supply vehicles to distract Russian drone operators.

In another approach, the Russians build large chicken-wire cages around their tanks. The small first-person view drones carry only small warheads, which harmlessly detonate in the chicken wire, not on the tank itself.

The fight goes on

Drone makers are now focusing on countering the counter-drone measures. The Shahed drones are getting quieter, receiving coatings that make them harder to detect with radar, and are being painted in hard-to-see colours.

Drones, in general, also keep getting smaller, more sophisticated and cheaper. The numbers of drones in the air at any time continues to increase, allowing vast formations of drones of different kinds that support each other. Some drones in a formation might act as decoys to attract defensive systems and others might try to jam them, allowing at least some of the attack drones to survive and penetrate the defences.

A major recent step-change is the shift to make drones more autonomous. Since Russia deployed GPS-jamming systems, Ukraine has developed digital scene-matching technology so its long-range attack drones can find their targets even without GPS.

For battlefield drones, both sides have drones incorporating artificial intelligence that can recognise targets and, after verification by a human operator, attack autonomously. While the target detection software is unreliable and still needs operator input, such drones are much less vulnerable to jamming of communications transmission links or GPS.
New defensive systems are emerging, too. Some first-person view drones are now being used like fighter aircraft to physically attack hostile airborne drones.

Laser systems now being trialled can dazzle a drone’s video camera, preventing the drone operator seeing possible targets. Some newer lasers can even cause physical damage to drones within a few kilometres of the laser.

The interplay between drones and drone countermeasures will continue as long as the war does.

Peter Layton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Chicken wire, AI and mobile phones on sticks: how the drone war in Ukraine is driving a fierce battle of innovation

Drones are the signature technology of the Ukraine war. A few miniature aircraft designs were used in the war’s early days, but an incredible array of drones have now evolved. There are different types, sizes and levels of sophistication. They are used for many roles including short- and long-range attack, reconnaissance, electronic disruption, communications relay and supply.

Many are repurposed consumer drones, such as the low-cost Chinese DJI designs sold in electronics stores. Such drones are modified as combat demands require and are being flown in their hundreds every day in Ukraine.

Before the war, military aircraft were very expensive and military forces could field very few. Drones have completely upended this situation, hugely increasing the numbers of air systems.

Ukraine is now making more than 3,000 first-person view (or FPV) drones each day (that is not a typo). These allow an operator to see from the drone’s camera in real time.

A new multinational drone coalition, of which Australia is part, plans to deliver one million of these. They can be assembled from commercially available digital electronics in small workshops and people’s homes.

Larger drones are made in purpose-built factories, but production rates remain stunning compared with modern military aircraft. The United States makes about 150 F-35 jet fighters a year. Russia’s new factory making Shahed 136 long-range attack drones will churn out 6,000 annually.

Drone defence

Wars involve actions and reactions, as each side struggles to gain advantage. The mass use of drones has inspired a rush to field a matching array of counter-drone systems.

Broadly speaking, these systems come in two kinds: those used for homeland defence and those protecting soldiers on the battlefield.

For homeland defence, the aim is to detect attacking drones, track them and try to destroy them when they come within range. The Russians often fire between 80 and 100 Shahed drones against Ukraine cities each night, usually in waves. These drones are noisy, low-flying and slow.

Ukraine has developed an ingenious system to detect the Shahed drones. Two engineers working in a garage created a sound-detecting system using consumer mobile phones stuck on poles that can hear drones passing by.

Data from a network of 9,500 phone-on-pole sensors is then relayed to a central command post, where it is fused together to give a complete picture of what is happening in the airspace across the whole of Ukraine. Gun or missile air defences are then activated and moved as necessary to fire at passing Shahed drones.

The Ukrainian air defences generally destroy about 80% of the attacking drones.

Drones on the battlefield

Battlefield drone defence is different. Here the drones are small and quiet, and crucially are not autonomous. Each drone needs to be flown by an operator who watches the video transmitted from the drone to find the enemy forces. The aim of counter-drone efforts is primarily to evade detection, and only try to destroy the drones if there is no alternative.

Most vehicles in the battlefield have sensors to detect a drone’s communication transmission links when they are nearby. Vehicles can then speed up to make it harder for the slow-moving drones to attack, or stop and hide under overhead cover, such as trees or building awnings.

Battlefield vehicles can also carry electronic systems able to jam the drone’s communications transmission links or the drone’s GPS satellite navigation system, thereby making the drones ineffective.

First-person view drones can also chase down and attack individual soldiers. Against these, soldiers stop moving, hide in trenches and try to blend in with the background.

The Ukrainians also use a vast array of decoy systems such as wooden tanks and supply vehicles to distract Russian drone operators.

In another approach, the Russians build large chicken-wire cages around their tanks. The small first-person view drones carry only small warheads, which harmlessly detonate in the chicken wire, not on the tank itself.

The fight goes on

Drone makers are now focusing on countering the counter-drone measures. The Shahed drones are getting quieter, receiving coatings that make them harder to detect with radar, and are being painted in hard-to-see colours.

Drones, in general, also keep getting smaller, more sophisticated and cheaper. The numbers of drones in the air at any time continues to increase, allowing vast formations of drones of different kinds that support each other. Some drones in a formation might act as decoys to attract defensive systems and others might try to jam them, allowing at least some of the attack drones to survive and penetrate the defences.

A major recent step-change is the shift to make drones more autonomous. Since Russia deployed GPS-jamming systems, Ukraine has developed digital scene-matching technology so its long-range attack drones can find their targets even without GPS.

For battlefield drones, both sides have drones incorporating artificial intelligence that can recognise targets and, after verification by a human operator, attack autonomously. While the target detection software is unreliable and still needs operator input, such drones are much less vulnerable to jamming of communications transmission links or GPS.
New defensive systems are emerging, too. Some first-person view drones are now being used like fighter aircraft to physically attack hostile airborne drones.

Laser systems now being trialled can dazzle a drone’s video camera, preventing the drone operator seeing possible targets. Some newer lasers can even cause physical damage to drones within a few kilometres of the laser.

The interplay between drones and drone countermeasures will continue as long as the war does.

Peter Layton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

The Australian government hands out hundreds of millions per year in grants to businesses. We find much of it is wasted

Australia hands out the best part of A$1 billion per year in grants to businesses. Many of these come with no strings attached, meaning there is no need to evaluate whether the grants boost employment, help the recipients become more efficient, or benefit the nation.

To test what good these grants do, my team at the Institute of Public Accountants-Deakin University Small and Medium Enterprise Research Centre tracked the performance of the 141,800 firms that received a total of $4.2 billion in Commonwealth government grants in the five years from 2018 to 2022.

Our task was made easier by a requirement that from 2018 all grants from Commonwealth entities be published on the government’s GrantConnect website.

GrantConnect gave us information about each firm that received a grant, which we used to examine its finances and compare them to the finances of other firms of similar sizes in similar locations and industries.

The largest number of grants were to firms that specialised in innovation and R&D (9,086), especially in the manufacturing and professional, scientific and technical industries. Another 2,150 were for “business development” and 2,084 were aimed at “small business”.

As far as we know, ours is the first such study in Australia.

Multiple recipients performed poorly

We find many of the grants generated no significant improvements in the performance of the firms that received them. In some cases they might have harmed them.

The firms that received repeated grants (almost two-thirds of the total) exhibited lower than normal efficiency and productivity. This suggests Australia’s system of grants might be propping up and sustaining an entire cohort of
underperforming “subsidy businesses”.

This finding lends weight to predictions of global studies that have found receiving grants can lead to a “grant mentality” or “grant culture” within individual businesses.

These generally low-performing multiple grant recipients got $1.3 billion of the $4.2 billion total.

How grants are awarded matters

The average picture looked good. On average, the firms that received the grants boosted their employment, their business performance and their efficiency.

But the way in which the recipient was selected mattered a lot.

The firms that were simply awarded grants on the basis of being eligible rather than having to compete for them did badly. They suffered average declines in their returns on assets of 4.9% and declines in their turnover of 6.6%.

The overwhelming majority of grants (eight in ten) were awarded this way. Applicants merely had to meet eligibility criteria, without any assessment of their merits relative to other applicants or their obligations to taxpayers.

Older businesses gained more from grants than younger businesses. Recipients aged ten years and older increased their returns on assets by an average of 3.5% compared to startups, which increased their returns by an average of 2.7%.

For employment, things were the other way around. Startups recorded high average workforce gains of 5.1% compared to older firms, which recorded only 1.3%.

Opaque by design

We found it hard to assess the outcomes of grants against criteria because the Commonwealth seldom provides criteria with which to assess grant outcomes.

Nor, typically, does it provide comprehensive information on the purposes of individual grants.

This suggests a worrying lack of rigour in the government’s grant selection processes. There’s little to stop public funds going to companies that fail to convert taxpayer support into positive results for themselves or for the nation.

The Australian National Audit Office has also found a broad and systemic lack of transparency throughout most Commonwealth government grants programs, as we did in an earlier report on the process by which grants are awarded in February.

Our report found that while competitive selection was rare for every category of business grants, it was especially rare for business development grants, small business grants and industry innovation grants.

Small business grants awarded via ministerial discretion had higher average values than grants awarded via formal processes.

Ministers handed out about half-a-billion dollars without formal processes between 2018 and 2022.

While small tweaks to the existing system might help, our report recommends a complete overhaul to make the processes merit-based with clear criteria and benchmarks for success as well as evaluations of success after the event.

Importantly, our recommendations would be relatively costless, both for grant administrators and applicants.

Our investigations are not complete. Later this year we will publish our findings about grants to non-business community organisations.

George A. Tanewski, as Director of he IPA-Deakin SME Research Centre, receives funding from the Institute of Public Accountants.

The Australian government hands out hundreds of millions per year in grants to businesses. We find much of it is wasted

Australia hands out the best part of A$1 billion per year in grants to businesses. Many of these come with no strings attached, meaning there is no need to evaluate whether the grants boost employment, help the recipients become more efficient, or benefit the nation.

To test what good these grants do, my team at the Institute of Public Accountants-Deakin University Small and Medium Enterprise Research Centre tracked the performance of the 141,800 firms that received a total of $4.2 billion in Commonwealth government grants in the five years from 2018 to 2022.

Our task was made easier by a requirement that from 2018 all grants from Commonwealth entities be published on the government’s GrantConnect website.

GrantConnect gave us information about each firm that received a grant, which we used to examine its finances and compare them to the finances of other firms of similar sizes in similar locations and industries.

The largest number of grants were to firms that specialised in innovation and R&D (9,086), especially in the manufacturing and professional, scientific and technical industries. Another 2,150 were for “business development” and 2,084 were aimed at “small business”.

As far as we know, ours is the first such study in Australia.

Multiple recipients performed poorly

We find many of the grants generated no significant improvements in the performance of the firms that received them. In some cases they might have harmed them.

The firms that received repeated grants (almost two-thirds of the total) exhibited lower than normal efficiency and productivity. This suggests Australia’s system of grants might be propping up and sustaining an entire cohort of
underperforming “subsidy businesses”.

This finding lends weight to predictions of global studies that have found receiving grants can lead to a “grant mentality” or “grant culture” within individual businesses.

These generally low-performing multiple grant recipients got $1.3 billion of the $4.2 billion total.

How grants are awarded matters

The average picture looked good. On average, the firms that received the grants boosted their employment, their business performance and their efficiency.

But the way in which the recipient was selected mattered a lot.

The firms that were simply awarded grants on the basis of being eligible rather than having to compete for them did badly. They suffered average declines in their returns on assets of 4.9% and declines in their turnover of 6.6%.

The overwhelming majority of grants (eight in ten) were awarded this way. Applicants merely had to meet eligibility criteria, without any assessment of their merits relative to other applicants or their obligations to taxpayers.

Older businesses gained more from grants than younger businesses. Recipients aged ten years and older increased their returns on assets by an average of 3.5% compared to startups, which increased their returns by an average of 2.7%.

For employment, things were the other way around. Startups recorded high average workforce gains of 5.1% compared to older firms, which recorded only 1.3%.

Opaque by design

We found it hard to assess the outcomes of grants against criteria because the Commonwealth seldom provides criteria with which to assess grant outcomes.

Nor, typically, does it provide comprehensive information on the purposes of individual grants.

This suggests a worrying lack of rigour in the government’s grant selection processes. There’s little to stop public funds going to companies that fail to convert taxpayer support into positive results for themselves or for the nation.

The Australian National Audit Office has also found a broad and systemic lack of transparency throughout most Commonwealth government grants programs, as we did in an earlier report on the process by which grants are awarded in February.

Our report found that while competitive selection was rare for every category of business grants, it was especially rare for business development grants, small business grants and industry innovation grants.

Small business grants awarded via ministerial discretion had higher average values than grants awarded via formal processes.

Ministers handed out about half-a-billion dollars without formal processes between 2018 and 2022.

While small tweaks to the existing system might help, our report recommends a complete overhaul to make the processes merit-based with clear criteria and benchmarks for success as well as evaluations of success after the event.

Importantly, our recommendations would be relatively costless, both for grant administrators and applicants.

Our investigations are not complete. Later this year we will publish our findings about grants to non-business community organisations.

George A. Tanewski, as Director of he IPA-Deakin SME Research Centre, receives funding from the Institute of Public Accountants.